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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

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NOTE FOR: 

DCI Staff

FROM : Hans Heymann, Jr  
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SUBJECT : DCI's Questions Concerning President Zia's Attitudes

Presented with these five points, Zia would almost certainly give President Reagan his unqualified assurances on at least four and perhaps all of the five:

- o No material violations of safeguards--he could make the planned diversions at the KANUPP Karachi reactor sufficiently ambiguous as to be plausibly deniable. There would, however, continue to be controversy about adequacy of safeguards at that reactor.
- o No transfer of sensitive nuclear technology--there is no significant immediate incentive for Pakistan to share its weapons-oriented know-how with other countries.
- o No nuclear weapons testing--he can forego this indefinitely with only a modest penalty in the form of uncertainty about the eventual weapon performance.
- o No assembly of a weapon--since this is almost totally unverifiable and can in any event be postponed to the last moment, he can certainly promise this.

The sticking point is "unsafeguarded reprocessing." He would surely characterize the beginning of reprocessing as being authorized under IAEA rules, but this would quickly turn into an international brouhaha.

I believe Zia can and will give unqualified assurances that he will abstain from all weapons-related activities. He may well continue to postpone the beginning of reprocessing beyond the current mid-May target date, but for how long, no one can tell, since domestic political pressures in Pakistan will surely build against an indefinite postponement of the weapons capability.



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